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Odysseus as Antihero
by Nick Conger
"[N)ei ther fondness for my son, nor pity / for an old father, nor the love for Penelope / which should
have made her happy, / could overcome in me the desire I had / to gain experience of the world and
of the vices and the worth of men. / ... Consider what origin you had; / you were not created to live
like brutes, but to seek virtue and knowledge."
Odysseus in Dante's Divine Comedy, Inferno, Canto 26.94-99,118-120
After a cursory reading of Homer's Odyssey, many see Odysseus as a man worthy of imitation. However, a closer
review of subtle, yet significant lines throughout the Odyssey reveals quite different aspects of the actions and words of
Odysseus. In the Divine Comedy, Dante presents a different Odysseus, an Odysseus selfish at heart. Although he may
be the most cunning and resourceful Achaian, he is far from being a true hero because he lacks certain qualities of
leadership and virtue that would have made him truly worthy of imitation.
Odysseus reveals his true nature several times in his escapade with Polyphemus, the Cyclops. Odysseus himself
recalls,
"From the start my companions spoke to me and begged me
to take some of the cheeses, come back again, and next time
to drive the lambs and kids from their pens, and get back quickly
to the ship again, and go sailing off across the salt water;
but I would not listen to them." (9.224-228)
Odysseus does not listen to them, and consequently six of his bravest companions die in the cave.
Although Odysseus uses his gifted mind to trick Polyphemus and escape, he departs with six fewer men and only
a fraction of the booty he could have acquired had he listened to the sensible advice given. Odysseus is pleased because
he has made a name for himself and is no longer nobody. To Odysseus, this change means he is beginning to exhibit
heroic characteristics. In fact, he is so wrapped up in his boasting and taunting that he does not recognize his failure,
and cares nothing for his lost men. He says, "But they began to mourn for the others; only I would not let them cry out"
(9.467-468).
Because of Odysseus' obsession wi th his own fame and glory, he is in no hurry to reach home. It does not matter
to him that his men are weary after ten years of fighting. Since he did not acquire quite as much fame as some of the
Achaian heroes during the Trojan War, Odysseus believes tha t he has to seek new adventure to make a name for himself.
While the other Argives anxiously run to their ships to head home, Odysseus takes his men on a detour and sacks the
city of the Kikonians. Thus, the ten years of fighting and sacking of Troy were not enough for Odysseus to emerge as
a hero.
A further indication of Odysseus' desire to explore and to acquire fame occurs when he is in sight of his homeland.
For even wi th the blessings of the winds of Aiolos, Odysseus subconsciously does not want to go home; ifhe did, he would
not have been delinquent in his duty of steering the ship home and would have remained awake to insure a safe and quick
homecoming for his comrades.
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In Odysseus' fervor for fame he does not demonstrate virtue worthy of imitation. In addition to Odysseus'
willingness to endanger the lives ofhis companions, Dante focuses on another aspect of Odysseus' corrupt nature when
he has Odysseus admit, "The desire I had was to gain experience of the world" (Canto 26. 97-98). What kind of man
would, after ten years' absence, continue to keep his family in mournful limbo while he selfishly seeks fame and glory?
This selfishness is obvious when he spends one year in luxury with the goddess Circe while his home is being invaded
by suitors. Ultimately, Odysseus is not the one who wants to leave, but his crew rebukes him, saying, ''What ails you
now? It is time to think about our own country" (9.472). Odysseus stays even longer with the nymph Kalypso. Thus,
while his wife struggles to fight off the pestering suitors, Odysseus is in effect frolicking with nymphs and goddesses.
Homer provides a subtle yet strong indication of Odysseus' vice when he writes, "He wept for a way home, since the
nymph was no longer pleasing to him" (5.153).
Odysseus does indeed have a brilliant mind. Time and time again, his cunning, teamed with his gift of rhetoric,
enables him to survive the perils of various islands. Many poets and singers will praise his deeds throughout the land.
However, with a more critical reading, the subtle phrases that Homer inserts within the text prevent Odysseus from
being considered a true hero, for Odysseus is not worthy of imitation. A true hero would have brought as many of his
men safely back home alive, but his own taunting of Polyphemus is the reason that Poseidon crushes his ship and kills
his men. Finally, unlike Odysseus, a man worthy of imitation would be concerned for his wife, son, and dying father,
who faithfully await his return. The Achaian heroes of the Trojan War moved on since the fall of Troy. Nestor and
Menelaos are tending to their estates and people, content with home life. Even the ghost of Achilleus relinquished his
quest for fame: "I would rather follow the plow as thrall to another man, one with no land allotted him and not much
to live on, than be king over all the perished dead" (11.489-491). It is time for Odysseus to mature like the real Achaian
heroes and concern himself with his family, estate, and people in Ithaka.
Works Cited
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Socrates' Teleological Revolution
by Greg Schneider
To the modem reader, Thales' proclamation that water is the primal stufffrom which all things come sounds terribly
absurd and primitive. Furthermore, calling this proclamation a revolution in the history of thought seems all the more
rash. Yet, with this statement, Thales for the first time in recorded history had put forth a demythologized account of
nature. Instead of Poseidon shaking his staff as an explanation of earthquakes, Thales has the primal waters that support
the disc Earth toss and turn. The gods were gone in his explanations and he had replaced them with a more detached
and rational approach. Science and philosophy were born. From this point onward, the dialogue of scientific thought
progresses. Anaximander would find Thales' water too determinate and too restrictive. Moist water could not explain
fire and rock soAnaximander postulated a boundless, indeterminate primal matter. This Boundless which was in eternal
motion could swirl and take on forms of planets. He too was later attacked, this time by Anaximenes, who made a plea
for air as the primal stuff, condensing and thinning to explain change. Empedocles later incorporated several of his
predecessors and put forth four primal elements - earth, air, fire and water. These four elements were combined and
separated in various proportions by the forces Love and Strife.
By now, causal forces had been added to the conception of the world. This development continued and Anaxagoras
ultimately postulated a world driven and ruled by Mind. An infinite variety of "seeds" are somehow mixed and given
an intelligent plan through this universal Mind. Philosophy was now contending intentional design in nature but not
with much force. Anaxagoras conceived of Mind, but in describing most actual physical examples, he returned to the
seeds as the reasons for things. In some way the lettuce that a rabbit eats contains the flesh seeds and bone seeds that
become digested. The Atomist Democritus would find this explanation inadequate. He called for tiny particles like
seeds but made them more primal, differing only in size and shape not quality. He believed his "atoms" in constant
motion in a void could explain generation and corruption without the danger of something coming from nothing.
Finally history arrives at Plato, who inherits the entire preceding dialectic of thought as mediated by Socrates. In his
dialogue the Phaedo, Plato recounts Socrates' contact with the evolution of philosophy and Socrates' reaction to it. The
intellectual biography ultimately reveals a most revolutionary step in the conception of nature. Socrates' interaction
with the physical scientists before him left him unsatisfied and he departed from their physical depictions of nature.
Instead, he turned toward deliberation and teleology and approached the natural order, as he did the pol itical order, with
theories and a series of goods and ends.
Socrates' intellectual biography appears at a point in the Phaedo where Socrates is responding to an objection by
Cebes. Cebes questions Socrates' contention that the soul is immortal, and not just long-lived, and wonders how the
soul's entering and leaving the body can be better explained. Socrates responds by simply going through his own
investigation of the problem of change in general in nature. He begins, ''When I was young, Cebes, I had an
extraordinary passion for ... natural science. I thought it would be marvelous to know the causes for which each thing
comes and ceases and continues to be" (Phaedo 96a). Simply by asking himself questions about specific problems in
nature, as Thales and Anaximenes had done before him, he thought he could come to a general formula. He ponders
the origin of living beings and the place of thought in man's body. The investigation does nothing but frustrate him,
though, and he is left with several shaky conceptions. The passages imply a contention by Plato that all examinations
of purely physical phenomena, of appearances, do not further knowledge.
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In his frustration, Socrates laments, "I was so befogged by these speculations that I unlearned even what I had
thought I knew ... " (96c). Being founded on appearances, physics' goal of explaining movement cannot be
accomplished, for only an examination of the eternal and unchanging can provide knowledge. Plato does not appeal
to the eternal in this passage specifically, but his frustration with terrestrial phenomena and his placement of the theory
of forms immediately after the biography certainly indicate this appeal. Socrates in fact continues to describe his
confusion. Holding that growth obviously comes from eating, as flesh comes from flesh in food and blood from blood
in food, and that a tall man is literally "taller than a head" than a short man, Socrates rejects these theories upon further
consideration. He even becomes befuddled by simple addition: "I cannot even convince myself that when you add one
to one either the first or the second one becomes two ... " (96e-97a). Completely physical and material investigation
offers no definitive answers. In the first place, one can never achieve a complete account of all the conditions
surrounding a change. In the second place, these conditions, these surrounding facts, do not get at the root of the change
itself. Plato is looking for causes not conditions.
Anaxagoras provides this clue to Socrates that causes cannot be reached by examining conditions. His initial
exposure to Anaxagoras comes from a reading he hears, and he immediately likes the theory of Mind. As he remarks,
"This explanation pleased me. Somehow it seemed right that mind should be the cause of everything ... mind in
producing order sets everything in order and arranges each individual thing in the way that is best for it" (97c). With
the introduction of the "best," Plato and Socrates begin their revolution in physics. Herein lies Plato's key distinction
between a teleological explanation and a mechanical one. All of Socrates' predecessors had insisted on a material
depiction of change. Even Anaxagoras' Mind was physical though intellectual. Anaxogoras implied planning and
intelligence, but Plato insists on the "best." Everything in nature has a purpose or goal. All heavy objects fall to the
earth because it is "best" that they should do so. Falling is not just a mechanistic, random completion of some situation
set up by gravity. Plato says that it is more; somehow the earrh's gravitational pull is a good. The situations Plato
describes include the flatness or roundness of the earth and the motions of the sun and moon. He is ready to grant
Anaxagoras his complete loyalty if he can explain why it is best for the earth to be the shape it is or the moon to travel
the way it does.
Unfortunately, Socrates finds Anaxagoras sorely disappointing. He had hoped to find out "as soon as possible about
the best and the less good." Instead he discovers "that the fellow made no use of mind and assigned it no causality of
the order of the world, but adduced causes like air and aether and water and many other absurdities" (98b-c). As Socrates
himself had confusedly held that eating causes growth as flesh comes from flesh, he finds similar reasoning in the seeds
of Anaxagoras. Condi tions Iike the fac t tha t eati ng preceded growth were bei ng substi tu ted for the true cause of growth,
the end that it serves. Asked why Socrates was lying in his prison cell, Anaxagoras would answer that his muscles, bones
and sinews being at certain angles and tensions would explain it. Socrates finds this explanation absurd and says that
of course the real reason stems from his condemnation by Athens and his choice to stay and submit to his penalty. The
surrounding material descriptions of his situation seem meaningless in any claim of causality. Socrates almost pities
Anaxagoras, "Fancy being unable to distinguish between the cause of a thing and the condition without which it could
not be a cause! It is this later ... that most people, groping in the dark, call a cause ... "(99b). Once again, Plato likes
to portray everything in the universe as having an end or goal or purpose. A mechanical explanation must always be
subordinated to a teleological one.
Frustrated by Anaxagoras' account of the uni verse but convinced that the mind still offers a good model for the way
the world operates, Socrates turns to his own mind to understand the causes of change. At this point he rejects physical
explanations altogether. Considering mechanical explanations to be only confusing and having no access to true
knowledge, he abandons physics. Like a person investigating an eclipse who becomes blinded by the sun, Socrates makes
the analogy, "I conceived of something like this happening to myself and I was afraid that by observing objects with my
eyes and trying to comprehend them with each of my other senses I might blind my soul altogether" (99d-e). Instead
he looks to his own theories for the truth about the world. Plato again seems to be pointing toward the eternal and the
unchangeable, that is the forms, that he brings up in the next section of the text. In away he also implies that the universe
operates as the human mind does. Now he is justified inchoosinga theory he thinks is the best "and then whatever seems
to agree with it-with regard either to causes or to anything else- I assume to be true, and whatever does not I assume
not to be true" (100a). The Socratic revolution in thought is complete; the explanation of the universe, like the
explanation of Socrates' imprisonment, should be given on the model of human decision, of a world bound by "moral
obligation" (99c). Just as a person, when he wishes to bring about some certain course of events, deliberates, so all things
can be explained in terms of their deliberation, their goal. Just as a person when deliberating thinks about the good he
can achieve, so all things and events have some good that they are fulfilling. Finally, just as a person when asked why
he did something states the good he was striving for, so all things have a good that can explain the "why" of their
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existence. As Socrates says back when he is first acquainted with Anaxagoras' mind, "There was only one thing for a
man to consider, with regard both to himself and to anything else, namely the best and highest good" (97d). With this
teleological conception of things, Plato alters the course of science forever. Socrates' intellectual biography points to
a more fundamental shift in the way man looks at reality.
The biography is followed immediately by Plato's theory ofForms and its relation to the immortality of the soul.
Knowledge has been firmly asserted as being only in the realm of the everlasting and immutable and physics has been
dismissed. Most philosophy before Socrates and Plato was concerned with natural science. From earth, air, fire and water
to physical forces of Love and Strife, from an infinite number of seeds to a material guiding Mind, philosophy sought
a tangible explanation for things. Naturally man first asking what makes up reality turns to what he can most
immediately grasp on to, the sensible world. Yet Socrates and Plato emphasized more strongly what others had
mentioned before - the tenuous nature of this grasp on the sensible world. Plato moreover places more emphasis on
ethics and politics than on the natural order. Man's relations to his fellow man stand paramount in the great
philosopher's mind. Nature merely imitates the human decision process. No longer are natural events the commands
of bickering gods in Homer's Iliad but the result of deliberation, possessing an ultimate fulfillment. In fact, according
to Plato, all things aim toward a good automatically and the world as a whole is driven toward the best.
Work Cited
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Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle's Ethics
by Gregory [. Lensing
In modem day America, the concept of virtue has been narrowed and distorted to such an extent that it is difficult
to see its connection with the virtue discussed by Aristotle in the Nicornachean Ethics. To the modem American, virtue
frequently is thought of with regard to the realm of sexuality alone, and then strictly in the sense of self-abnegation.
Even when applied to the broader range of human actions, virtue most often is associated with self-restraint, or refusal
to indulge in this or that wrong action. Defined thus, it is no wonder that virtue is taken as something unpleasant or
even onerous. For Aristotle, though, virtue is much broader than a kind of puritanical asceticism; it is a kind of all-
encompassing excellence in one's particular function. The virtuous man isone who is mostfully man, who has perfected
his faculties of body and soul in the ways pecul iar to human bei ngs. Yet, this defini tion does not answer certain questions.
If virtue is painful, why should we desire it? If it is pleasant, why does it require work to achieve it?
As to the pleasantness or painfulness of virtue, it seems clear that Aristotle believes virtue is pleasant. Evidence
of this understandably may be found in his definition of happiness, which is simply the active exercise of the soul's
faculties in conformity with excellence, or if there are several excellences, with the best and most perfect among them
(1.7.15-16). He adds that external goods are also required for happiness, since it is impossible, or at least difficult, to
live a life of virtue without the necessary equipment (1.8.15). The possession of virtue is primary in this definition of
happiness as "virtue equipped," for these external things are "of the nature of auxiliary means, and useful instrumentally"
(1.9.7 -8). The reader may well recall Plato's tyrant in the Republic, who possesses all manner of external goods but lacks
virtue, and so is made miserable by the disorder of his soul.
Part of the reason that Aristotle claims virtue is pleasant, however, is his very definition of the virtuous act as one
in which the virtuous man takes pleasure. He writes that "no one would call a man just ifhe did not like acting justly
,. : . and similarly with the other virtues" (1.8.12-13). Yet in the modern mind, one who enjoyed acting justly might
well be counted ~ virtuous than one who acts justly but against his inclinations. There might even be a question as
to whether the man who enjoyed virtuous acts should be considered virtuous at all.
For Aristotle, though, it is clear that the truly virtuous man acts with knowledge, with deliberate choice, and from
a fixed disposition of character (2.4.3), and that the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant (1.8.10). He notes that
the multitude takes pleasure "in things that conflict with one another, because they are not pleasant of their own nature,"
while "things pleasant by their own nature are pleasant to lovers of what is noble" (1.8.11). This argument seems less
than conclusive, for there are few things which men could universally agree upon as being pleasant by their own nature,
owing to the great range of tastes and opinions. Indeed, it would seem that pleasantness is something that is perceived
by the agent, rather than something inherent in the act, for depending on one's habits or upbringing, the same act may
be perceived as pleasant or unpleasant, justas the same food may be judged tasty by one man and loathsome by another.
Aristotle seems to provide insufficient proof to demonstrate that the acts chosen by the virtuous man are pleasant
essentially, while the others are not pleasant of themselves.
Even if we agree with Aristotle that virtue is pleasant, we might well ask at this point why it is that we must work
to achieve it. One answer may be derived qui te easily from his observation that the virtues are neither naturally present
in us, nor in violation of our nature, but that "nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought
to maturity by habit" (2.1.3). Many analogies present themselves to support the plausibility of this proposition. For
instance, the condition of being physically fit is a capacity brought to actuality by exercise, which is itself difficult and
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laborious, but brings about the pleasant condition offitness. In the sphere of mental activity, learning is a painful process
by which we actualize our potential to be learned, which is generally agreed to be a preferable condition. Thus, once
one is habituated to virtue, and his actions spring from a fixed disposition of character, it is clear that Aristotle believes
he will prefer his new condition of being virtuous and enjoy performing virtuous acts.
There remains the question of why virtue, if its active exercise is essentially good and pleasant, should be thought
painful. The answer must lie in the process of becoming virtuous, since the condition itself has already been said to be
pleasant in itself. On the subject of how to hit the mean in one's conduct (which Aristotle takes as the definition of
virtue), the Philosopher says that "we must in everything be most of all on guard against what is pleasant and against
pleasure; for when pleasure is on trial we are not impartial judges" (2.9.6). This shunning of pleasure is certainly alien
to the appetitive part of the soul, and can be accounted painful. Further, when defining what is properly called the
opposite of a virtue, Aristotle notes that we are prone to stray from the mean in the direction of pleasure, as in the case
of the virtue of temperance and the vice of profligacy (2.8.8). Thus, to maximize one's chance of hitting the mean,
Aristotle recommends erring on the side of the vice which is less opposed to the virtue, meaning the one which is less
pleasurable. Hence it seems true that the process by which one becomes virtuous is not a pleasant one, and it is easy
to see how the reputation of painfulness could come to be attached to the quality of the virtue itself.
Thus, by separating the condition of virtue from the process by which it is achieved, Aristotle seems to give a
satisfactory account of why virtue is reputed to be painful, and by distinguishing natural dispositions from natural
capacities he accounts for why it is difficult to achieve it. The weakest part of his argument remains his claim that
virtuous acts are pleasant of their own nature because the virtuous man judges them to be so. Vicious men would argue
that they enjoy their own actions, and even judge them pleasant of their own nature. Considering the fact that the
training one receives from childhood is "of very great, or rather supreme, importance" (2.1.8), it seems that even virtuous
men enjoy their acts simply because they have been habituated to them, rather than because they are essentially
pleasant. If a vicious man is reformed, who can say whether it is because he has recognized the inherent pleasantness
of virtuous acts or merely because, by punishment or threat, he has been habituated to do the virtuous act? This question
seems to be an unresolved dilemma, at least in the first two books of the Ethics.
Work Cited
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Marsilio of Padua: His Plan To Replace
The Authority of the Pope
by Carla Marie Clardy
Marsilio of Padua, in the midst of the so-called Babylonian Captivity of the papacy, wrote a colorful treatise on the
ills facing the Church. He also presented a solution. Convinced that the present institutions failed to provide the
necessary ends of justice and peace, Marsilio determined that an entirely new system was needed. He first outlined the
evils of the Church, stating of course the clear need for reform. Then he detailed his plan for a substitute for the corrupt
papacy. With what, then, did Marsilio suggest to replace the foul pontificate? After refuting the current politico-
theological system, Marsilio suggested a replacement based on closely linked church-state relations, perhaps ultimately
forming or causing a theocracy.
To preface his argument favoring an alternate Church structure, Marsilio listed the abuses of the papacy. For
example, he declared that the abolition of the episcopal election contaminated those offices affected (2.2, 480). Papal
appointments to ecclesiastical offices, especially with intent to claim a percentage of the benefice, resulted in
prostitution by those seeking office. Indeed, Marsilio claimed uneducated criminals were appointed to bishoprics,
perhaps even in lands where they were unfamiliar with the language (2.3,480). No longer were the high medieval
qualifications of virtue and learning a prerequisite to high church office. Moreover, those selected as bishops by the
pontiff were not theologians, but were "shyster lawyers" (2.7,481), selected for the purpose of gaining temporal goods
for the papacy (2.11, 483). The papacy, Marsilio declared, needed the income in order to fund wars against other
Christian lands (2.11,483). Furthermore, the pope disbanded many orders with hopes only of receiving from them the
financial benefits (2.13,484). He also decreed that all wills of bishops had to be approved by him, and that the property
of those bishops dying intestate would devolve to himself (2.14, 485). Clearly, aberrant practices flourished within the
institutional Church, and Marsilio was confident that checks needed to be placed on the papacy.
The new system or structure suggested by Marsilio included a "faithful human legislator," which he said was the
"whole body of citizens, or the weightier part thereof" (3.6,. 487). The faithful human legislator would function as the
final authority in spiritual matters. For example, no excommunications could take place without the express approval
of the faithful legislator (3.16, 488). They would also settle marriage and inheritance disputes, as well as determining
the number of churches, priests and benefices (3.19-23, 488). Also, this legislator would provide teaching certificates,
grant exemptions, judge heresy cases, call fasts, prohibitions and general councils, and proclaim saints (3. 25, 29, 30, 34,
33,35, 489). And, finally, this faithful legislator, or the ruler by its authority, would appoint bishops and compel them
to administer the sacraments (3. 41,40,490). Marsilio seemed to desire this body of bel ievers to exercise full authority
and power over the faithful.
Yet, many problems arise from Marsilio's proposal. First, the precise nature of the legislator is unclear. How was
it to be selected? based on what qualifications? under what circumstances? and, primarily, to what end? In other words,
who was to be included in the "faithful human legislator" and what was the body's purpose? It would seem that only the
virtuous and learned should be selected for the body, or at least to head it, but those were the criteria for the papacy and
had proved there to be unsuccessful. So, were the leaders of the legislator the powerful, the rich, or the lucky? Marsilio
is unclear on whether the legislator was a branch of the Church or of the State. The functions it would serve were
primarily spiritual, yet much of the terminology of the treatise reflects a political basis; "legislator" denotes a formal
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process for enacting statutes, laws and decrees, while "ruler" ordinarily refers to those in political power. Also, the
legislator, as Marsilio said, was to be composed of the "whole body of citizens," necessitating, then, a political unit of
which a common but not essential characteristic would be Christianity. Therefore. one must wonder whether the
legislator would serve a spiritual or temporal purpose, since it seems to approach both. If it were a function of the
Church, then the role of the State would become unclear. since the legislator would assume responsibility for a large
portion of human activity. Or, if thelegislatorwere to acton behalfof the State. then the purpose of the Church escapes
understanding. Perhaps the final problem facing Marsillo's "faithful human legislator" is the most serious. It seems
this legislator would remain unchecked. Nothing, aside from human reason. one presumes, serves to curb the will of
the legislator, since Marsilio claimed it must have ultimate and complete authority. How, then, will the legislator be
any different than the corrupt papacy? If the clear line between the realms of power of the Church and of the State
evident in the High Middle Ages is blurred so radically, then corruption, and possibly tyranny, seems to be a logical
result. Therefore. Marsilio's plan to eliminate moral decay almost surely fosters it.
Marsilio agreed wi th Dante Al ighieri and Will iam of Ockham that the pope was not the supreme authority, ei ther
in temporal or in spiritual matters. Yet, Marsilio made a rather radical claim in asserting thata new body. perhaps one
rooted even more deeply in legalism, should replace the centuries-old tradition of the papacy. Throughout the treatise.
he considered part of the downfall of the Church due to the pontiffs reliance on lawyers, yet his entire approach to
solving the recurrent problems seemed to rest on legislation. He desired to make the Church operate according to the
law. which was to be mandated by the will of the legislator. This growing tendency towards legalism. which seemed
to unite the Church inextricably to the State here, was potentially dangerous to the faithful. Questions of mercy,
charity and hope had no place within the code oflaw. In effect, a tyranny oflaw would rule. Marsilio wanted to replace
a good system gone awry with a much worse one: a theocracy. political rule by the Church, where the responsibilities
of Church and State were fused by the increasing emphasis on legalism and the de-emphasis on virtue and learning,
charity and hope. Indeed, the Church was becoming secularized.
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The New Heroism in Chretien's
Story of the Grail
by Christopher Anderson
In the Story of the Grail, Chretien de Troyes' contemporary readers would have expected a tale of the best knights,
high servants of the gallant ideal, who with exemplary prowess and gentility prevail against all challengers and win the
honor of their many friends. Yet Chretien's romance addresses these conventional expectations, but fulfills them
qualifiedly. His Gawain, whose character remains unchanged throughout the romance, is the seeming epitome of
chivalry commonly regarded. But Chretien pokes holes in the model knight's facade, thus diminishing his appeal.
Alongside Gawain, meanwhile, the author portrays Perceval, a knight-in-the-making, who lacks requisite knightly
virtues at first, but acquires them with time, along with virtues of which Gawain knows nothing. The irresistible appeal
of ascent deflects the reader's sympathy from Gawain to Perceval. By disappointing conventional expectations of
knightliness in Gawain while surpassing them in Perceval, Chretien subtly reveals for the reader's admiration a new code
of human greatness.
Gawain, unlike Perceval, has anestablished reputation as the paramount knight. He is the one closest by both blood
and affection to Arthur (the central figure in the chivalric enterprise), and, even before Chretien's romance begins, is
the standard of knightly excellence. The Story of the Grail's first readers would have regarded him so. Within the
romance, too, Arthur and his court and city consider Gawain their chief hero and more. In an echo of the Creed,
Chretien first refers to him as "my lord Gawain, who was sitting at the king's right hand" (428). He seems to be to the
chivalric enterprise what Christ is to the divine. His reputation, furthermore, is grounded in real virtue. As proof, he
prevails in the peril of the Wondrous Bed, which requires a knight "ideally handsome and wise, quite free of greed, valiant
and bold, with a noble and loyal heart, without baseness or other weakness" (474). If Chretien raises doubts, they are
not about the first of Gawain's essential virtue.
Nevertheless, the imperfections that Chretien does find in Gawain needle the reader. They diminish Gawain's
dignity. During a brief interlude in the story, Gawain is hunting a doe, which evades him when his horse loses a shoe.
A vassal must then tell him the obvious: "My lord, it needs to be shod" (449). And in Escavalon Gawain finds himself
set upon by a mob of angry-peasants. Toward them off he hurls chess pieces at them, the readiest weapons to hand. His
host and sworn enemy, who has unwittingly offered him hospitality, must come to his rescue. Both incidents show that
Gawain is not always in control, that he sometimes fails, and that he is even, at times, ridiculous.
As in Escavalon, Gawain often bears strangers' hatred. Guigambresil denounces him before all of Arthur's court
and accuses him of a dishonorable killing. Greoreas and Guiromelant, likewise, have mortal grievances against him.
And the "malicious maiden" vows to follow Gawain, until she should cause him to suffer "misfortune, griefand affliction,
shame and disaster in [her] company" (463). When he attempts to help her onto her palfrey she excoriates him: "I really
have no desire for you to serve me, for your hands are not clean enough to pass me anything I put on or wear around
my head. Are you fit to handle anything that touches my body, my mouth, my forehead or my face!" (465). The mantle
of honor that fits him so closely at Arthur's court shows gaping holes abroad.
Even within Arthur's court, Gawain bears the ill will of at least one dissenting knight. The seneschal Kay, no
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smooth talker himself, disdains his winning ways. He believes he has insight into the secret of Gawain's
knightly success and the insight is not flattering. When Kay has tried and failed to capture an unknown knight,
and Gawain offers to bring him in peacefully, Kay berates him at great length, playing upon Gawain's
reputation as the model knight:
Ah, Gawain, a hundred curses on my neck if you're at all so foolish that there isn't a great deal to be
learnt from you! You're very good atfinding a buyer for your words, extremely fair and polished as they
are .... Not that I'm trying to teach you anything. You'll know well enough how to smooth him down
like stroking a cat; and people will say: 'Now my lord Gawain's fighting fiercely!" (432)
To this tirade, his more politic comrade characteristically responds, "Ah, Sir Kay, you might have put that more
politely," and even calls him "my dear good friend." King Arthur closes the case with a word to his nephew: 'That's
a very courtly thing you've said" (432). And because Kay, in comparison, is so coarsely offensive, the reader is certain
to side with Gawain. Nevertheless, Kay's charge is never satisfactorily laid to rest, and doubts remain in the reader's mind
about the motives behind Gawain's actions.
Gawain's smooth speech, which Kay cannot stand, serves him nowhere so well as in the company of maidens.
Where he woos, he wins. Within minutes of meeting the damsel ofEscavalon, who would hate him mortally if she knew
first his identity, Gawain is making love to her: "They both engage in love-talk, for if they had spoken of anything else
they would have been really wasting their time. My lord Gawain asks insistently for her love, saying he will be her knight
for the rest of his life; and, far from refusing him, she agrees with alacrity." A vavasour entering at that point finds them
''kissing and having a very joyful time together" (451). Having learned that the knight she has just met is the one charged
with killing her father, she nonetheless sides with him against all her furious people. But constancy in love does not
seem to be among M virtues: shortly after leaving Escavalon he makes advances toward the "malicious maiden of
Lorges." She, though, is to the women in Gawain's life what Kay is to the men; she thinks she sees through the model
knight, admits that he meant at first to carry her off on his horse, and she curses him: "Don't you dare think of putting
me on your horse! I'm not one of those naive, foolish women who provide fun for knights who carry them along on their
horses on their chivalric expeditions" (462). He does eventually win her over. Yet even then, something of her
denunciation, like Kay's, lingers to pester the reader. Gawain is expert in the forms of love, but the substance of it still
is doubtful.
The reader's doubt, in fact, extends to all of Gawain's relations with others. He evinces little feeling on their behalf
beyond simple pleasures in the company of some. When he comes upon a fatally wounded knight asleep by a grieving
maiden, Gawain wakes him despite the maiden's ardent wish to let him sleep, since, as he says, "I'd like to ask him for
information about how things stand in this country." He gently shakes the knight's spur with the butt of his lance. The
knight's remarks upon waking emphasize Gawain's outward courtesy at the same time as they suggest a lack of deeper
concern: "Sir, Igive you five hundred thanks for having shown such consideration in nudging and waking me without
my suffering any harm" (461). Although, as the reader learns later when Gawain returns, he has the medicinal
knowledge to cure the knight, for the meantime he leaves him dying in the wood since he wishes to pursue an adventure
elsewhere. The wounded knight shows more concern than Gawain when he begs him not to risk himself in that peril.
Not even toward the long lost women of his family, who have suffered for years under an enchantment, including his
mother, his grandmother and a sister whom he has never met until he comes upon them all accidentally at Chanpguin,
does Gawain manifest any deep love. His most evident feeling on that occasion is pleasure at the great honor shown
him. However highly refined his knightly habits are, Gawain seems to lack basic empathy.
All of these limitations in Gawain's character, whether implied or demonstrated, seriously compromise the reader's
conventional high regard for that knight. But none of the devices Chretien employs for this purpose are as effective
as his juxtaposing Gawain's story with Perceval's. Gawain throughout his adventures in The Story of the Grail remains
essentially unchanged, while Perceval grows from a country lout to the greatest of knights. His stasis next to Perceval's
rise - particularly since Perceval's greatness eclipses his own by the end - proves deadly to his appeal. Gawain and
the conventional understanding of chivalry which he represents simply are upstaged.
Onto the stage of knighthood, then, strides Perceval, a high-spirited but uncouth young Welshman, whose
character at the beginning of the romance, though engaging, is distinctly unknightly. First impressions of him, by some
itinerant knights, are mixed. 'The Welsh are by nature more stupid than grazing beasts; and this one is just like a beast"
(377), says one. But another enjoys Perceval's curiosity, and answers all his questions about knighthood. His manners
and dress appall courtly tastes, but his natural appeal is still strong. At his firstentry into Arthur's court he makes a lasting
impression: 'The eyes in the head of the uncultivated lad were bright and laughing. No one who sees him thinks him
prudent; but all who set eyes on him consider him handsome and engaging" (387). And Arthur gives his own opinion:
The Constantin Review 13
"Although the youth is naive, he may well be of good birth; for it's a matter of upbringing, and he has learnt under a
bad master. He can still turn outa worthy vassal" (387). Unlike Gawain who, one imagines, was always as he is, Perceval
begins his career as a promising boor.
After the defect in manners, Perceval's ignorance of arms is his most glaring inadequacy. He thinks that armor
makes a knight and considers himselfbeknighted as soon as he puts on a suit of it. Not only does he not know how to
wield sword and shield, but he is also ignorant of the rules of fair fights. He thinks of the joust in hunting terms, and
of his opponent as a kind of animal to be taken down with hurled javelins. Speaking of the great Red Knight whom
he has just killed in this manner and whose armor he wants, Perceval says, "But I'll have chopped the corpse up into
steaks before I can get any of the armor off" (389). His early view of knightly combat as a species of the hunt reveals
a contempt for his opponent, which has no place in a legitimate joust, even if between mortal enemies. The young
Perceval lacks a worthy knight's respect for arms and the opponent.
Ifhis lack of respect for opposites in combat is disturbing, even more so is his lack of respect for opposites in love.
His first attempt at "love" exposes a defenseless maiden to great perils and hardships, and reveals his extreme roughness
of character. Against her will he takes kisses and a ring. While she weeps he insults her further by commending her
for not having bitter breath like a chambermaid's, eats his fill of the lunch meant for her and her lover, and, in spite of
her obvious grief, departs without an inkling of his guilt. In his primitive state Perceval is as little chivalrous toward
maidens as can be imagined.
Related to Perceval's early failure to respect others is his habit of delayed reaction. The first knights he sees, as a
youth at play in his mother's woods, repeatedly ask him for information about some other travelers whom they want to
find. But Perceval is so wrapped in the vision of their splendor, which is all new to him, that he ignores their questions
until they have answered all of his own. Then it is as though he comes out of a daze and remembers that they too want
information from him. When he subsequently leaves the wood to become a knight, he looks back at the house and sees
his doting mother fall in a swoon as if dead. But not until he has accomplished (or thinks that he has accomplished)
his goal of becoming a knight does he think of turning homeward to see how she fares. At Arthur's court, when Kay
strikes the laughing maiden on his account, Perceval fails to answer the affront right away, since he is at the moment
intent upon acquiring the Red Knight's arms; when he later has opportunities to redress her dishonor, he does so. In
the early part of his chivalric career, Perceval repeatedly manifests a severe self-absorption characteristic of youth,
perhaps, but hardly of knighthood.
His self-absorption and insensitivity show also in his impatience with others. His mother, who after years of silence
reveals to her son their illustrious but tragic family history, concludes her moving story in this way: "You were all the
comfort and the only blessing I had, for nobody else of my family remained: God had left me with no other source of
joy and happiness." Perceval's response shows how well he sympathizes with her: "Give me something to eat. I don't
know what you're talking to me about. I'd very much like to go to the kin, who makes knights; and so Ishall, whoever
may be sorry about it!" (380). Perceval "would not have given a penny" (385) for the charcoal-burner's tale of Arthur's
grief, nor "a chive" (387) for the king'sown. He speaks to people only to serve his own desires, with no regard whatever
for their concerns. His insularity and utilitarianism, so characteristic of his youth, stand in glaring opposition to the
knightly character whose image he seeks to grasp.
, All the defects of his character at the beginning of Perceval's career, however, do not preclude his development.
Arthur, for one, considers it possible that he could become "a worthy vassal." The laughing maiden even goes so far as
to tell him, "Young man, if you live long, I think and am convinced that in the whole world there will not be, nor has
there been, nor will anyone hear of any knight better than you. That's what I think and feel and believe" (388). And,
in fact, he does make rapid progress as a knight in several aspects of his character and reputation. Gornemant and
Gawain help to improve his appearance, and he learns all that Gornemant knows about arms and thei ruse in a very short
time. His speech and his manners improve. And almost immediately after taking arms he enjoys some stunning victories
in combat, which make him renowned and honored overnight, so much so that Arthur and all his court embark on a
quest on his account, to see him and find out his name. Quite naturally Perceval takes to the knightly life and easily
rises to the level of excellence that was previously Gawain's domain.
More crucial to Chretien's didactic purpose, however, are the dynamics by which Perceval surpasses Gawain. The
two knights do not meet and befriend each other until the younger knight approaches parity with the elder. Perceval
is coming out of a reverie in which he has discovered how one suffers love, rather than merely appropriating it like a
set of arms, and has for the first time understood what it means to care within his soul for another human being. Gawain
can appreciate the significance of Perceval's reverie even ifhe should not likely experience it himself. He leads Perceval
into the court where Arthur proclaims the laughing maiden's prophecy to have been fulfilled, and full courtly
14 Fall 1990
recognition of his chivalry is accorded the young knight. In the court's estimation, and thus also according to the
conventional understanding of chivalry, Perceval has reached his peak when he attains Gawain's height.
But from this meeting point the two knights part and embark upon separate quests: Gawain to answer an attack
on his honor; Perceval to save a people from devastation. Each has a string of adventures that earns him more renown.
Gawain wins the overlordship of a devoted people, and Perceval sends sixty great knights in defeat to Arthur's court.
But whereas Gawain's character ends just as it started, in pleasures at the honor that has rightly been given him,
Perceval's new-found depth makes him uneasy with his success. For five years he acts a part like Gawain's: the exemplary
knight, conventionally understood. Not until his chance encounter with a hermit, a man of great spiritual wisdom, does
he question the value of his knightly enterprise. Then, in his last great delayed reaction, Perceval suddenly appreciates
the nature and gravity of his life's errors. For the first time ever he feels fear: he is "greatly afraid he has sinned against
God" (458). The hermit confirms the basis for thefear but identifies his having "forgotten God" (458) with the initial
sin against his mother. It isChrist's duplex mandatum that Perceval has violated, the cornerstone of the New Law, which
commands man simply to love God with all his heart, soul and mind, and to love his neighbor as himself. To be full
of one's private purpose, as Perceval is when he leaves his mother for dead, is to turn away from God and neighbor and
into oneself. The penance which the hermit gives to the repentant Perceval, then, is not to abandon the chivalric
enterprise as being somehow inimical to the health of the soul, but rather to turn it to the service of the New Law. To
seek one's own profit is right and proper, but what one seeks must be for. the sake of the immortal soul rather than for
one's mortal reputations. As Perceval comes to this realization he rises surely above his fellow knight Gawain. Gawain
is indeed a great knight, but his greatness is pre-Christian. The man Perceval comes to be, in contrast, is the prototypal
Christian knight.
Chretien's project in The Story of the Grail, then, is to Christianize the medieval code of chivalry. His chief means
for the purpose is his ability to influence the readers' affections by playing upon their expectations. He presents for their
qualified admiration the essentially pagan Gawain, while suggesting his lirnitatiens as a model. And for their fuller
admiration he presents Perceval, suggesting in this case his possibilities as a model. The greener range to which Chretien
leads his audience is the field of Christian human greatness.
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The Role of Limbo in the Justice of the
Divine Comedy
by Terry Gilbert
Perhaps the most difficult theological problem that surfaces in Dante's Divine Comedy is that of the justice of Limbo.
Very soon after he begins to unfold his conception of the justice of the Inferno as a whole, Dante presents the readerwith
what seems to be an anomaly. The justice of the Inferno depends on human free choice. Hell is just because its
inhabitants are there of their own free will. Yet it seems that Limbo is the place for those who had no choice: unbaptized
infants and virtuous pagans-most significantly, Virgil. Despite this problem, Dante seems to have made a point of
placing Limbo within hell proper, at the price of rendering an already difficult doctrine almost impossible. By doing
so, Dante creates a tension between faith and rational understanding that runs throughout the whole Comedy. Farfrom
.being forced into this tension against his will by Catholic dogma, Dante extends it and even aggravates it in order to
emphasize the absolute necessity of faith and grace both for salvation and for understanding the justice of God.
If the question oflimbo is set aside, the overall picture of the justice of hell that emerges in the early cantos of the
Inferno seems rational and satisfying. Through the story ofa journey that he is supposed to have taken through hell under
the guidance of Virgil, Dante apparently is trying to enable the rational reader to understand the workings of divine and
perfect justice in that realm. The core of that justice is the fact that the inhabitants are thereof their own freewill. Dante
the Pilgrim is amazed to see that the souls want to cross over the river Acheron to the place of horrible and eternal
punishment, for their "fear is changed into desire" (Inferno 3. 126). This crossing is possible because the sin that they
freely chose in life brings its own punishment, a punishment which is the fulfillment of their desire in sinning. Deceived
''by the breadth of the entrance" of hell , the sinners do not realize that they are already receiving the punishment of hell
in life in the very act of sinning (Inferno 5.20). Just as the punishment that sin brought in life did not stop them from
choosing it anyway, the souls freely choose the eternal continuation of that sin and the suffering it brings.
Dorothy Sayers sums up well the essential fact that, according to Dante, nobody is ever sent to hell: "Men go there
of their own will. Hell is the state in which the will remains fixed eternally in that which it insisted on having; the
torments it endures are simply the sin itself, experienced at last, without illusion, as that which it really is ('The Divine
Poet," 47). Such a brilliant and rational account would seem to have been enough to dissol ve any doubt that one migh t
harbor about the justice of hell , if only Dante had not placed Limbo right in the middle of things and messed everything
up. For by situating Limbo in hell itself, after Virgil and Dante have crossed the Acheron, the poet makes the justice
of Limbo integral to the justice of the whole of the Inferno.
InLimbo, according to Virgil, are those who "did notsin, but having merit/was not enough, for they lackedbaptism"
(Inferno 4.34-5). The inhabitants "are afflicted only / in that they live in longing without hope" (Inferno 4. 41-42).
Present there are unbaptized pagans "of great worth," unbaptized infants, and prior to the "harrowing of hell," the worthy
followers of the Old Covenant (Inferno 4. 43-44). It is the fate of these men of "much worth" that is the main cause
of Dante's "great grief" (Inferno 4. 43). The fact of their damnation becomes a nagging question that surfaces time and
time again throughout his journey. The fact that he reacts so strongly shows just how far he is from understanding the
justice of Limbo. In other realms his lack of understanding led him to pity the inhabitant to a certain degree. Here,
however, his reac tion is ex treme grief, wh ich indica tes the much greater difficul ty invol ved in unders tandi ng the jus tice
of Limbo.
More striking, however, is the reaction of Virgil. The anguish that he shows in this realm is in stark contrast to his
reaction in the other circles, where he shows no pity. According to Mark Musa, ''Reason cannot feel pity for the just
punishment of sin; later [Virgil] will rebuke Dante for taking pity on the sinners" (102). If Virgil represents Reason on
some level at least, Virgil's uncharacteristic reaction would seem to indicate a great discrepancy in the ability of reason
to understand the justice of this circle as compared to the others. And yet Musa goes on to say that the "virtuous shades
in Limbo, of course, are not sinners, and the absence there of the light of God is pitiable" (102). Musa totally misses
the point here, for if Limbo is perfectly just, there can be no pity. The fact that Virgil does pity the inhabitants, and
evidently himself as well, shows that he does not grasp the justice of the situation. The poet seems to be indicating that
unaided reason cannot grasp the justice of Limbo to the degree that it can understand thejustice of the rest of the Inferno.
This fact does not mean that there is no understandable relationship between the justice of Limbo and that of the
rest of hell , however. Dante did not place Limbo in hell proper without reason, or because his Catholic faith required
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it. As a matter ci fact, the traditional teaching on Limbo was very different from Dante's. Aquinas had distinguished
the Limbo of the Fathers (followers ci the Old Covenant) from the Limbo of the infants, and represented unbaptized
children as not grieving at all for the loss of the Beatific Vision, but rather rejoicing in natural perfection and a certain
participation in the Divine Goodness (Gardner 119). Dante, on the other hand, puts them all together and adds the
virtuous pagans as well. All ci them suffer from a vague but hopeless longing that is truly hellish, even if it does not
involve the kind of torments that occur in the other circles. Dante presents Limbo not as a separate kind of state, as
Aquinas does (Summa Theo/ogica, Suppl. Q. 69 Art. 5), but as being the first circle of hell itself.
Clearly Dante has made a point of placing the unbaptized within the context of the justice of hell, at the price of
considerable theological innovation. This placement must mean that the justice of Limbo can somehow be understood
in light of the justice of the rest ci the Inferno, despite the implications of Virgil's lack of understanding. An obvious
possibility in the case of the honorable pagans would be that the eternal state they are in is simply the continuation of
the life they lived before death. Despite the "sighs" and "longing without hope," some of the inhabitants ciLimbo live
quite a noble existence. Those of "great merit" whose fate caused Dante such grief, such as the great poets and
philosophers, continue to enjoy the honor and "light" of natural reason that they did in life. According to Singleton,
"In the darkness before the Advent of Christ, these pagans had no other light than this; hence, their condition in Limbo
is as it was on earth. This is the justness or justice of their state in the afterlife" (61-62). Just as the sinners continue
their sinful life eternally, then, the pagans continue their life of reason and honor eternally. Alan Gilbert agrees that
Dante's Limbo represents "the state of the best men before the coming of Christ; in hell they live as they had lived on
earth" (78). Such a parallel is not enough to explain why Limbo is part of hell, however, because there stills seems to
be no free choice involved. After all, it was not by choice that Aristotle did not have the light of Christ.
Virgil's reformulation of the reason that he and the rest of the good pagans are lost in the seventh canto of the
Purgatorio suggests the possibility that some kind of choice was involved after all. Here Virgil says that "for no other
fault did I lose Heaven except not having Faith" (7.7 -8, emphasis added.). Dorothy Sayers interprets this as involving
a general lack offaith in the nature of things in addition to a lack of specifically Christian faith (Divine Comedy I, 95).
This lack of faith was a failure to imagine anything better than the life they had rationally devised; a failure to imagine
an eternity of bliss ("Dante's Virgil," 64). Their "condemnation" is just, because in Limbo "they should 'have what they
chose'; they enjoy the kind of after-life which they themselves imagined for the virtuous dead" (Divine Comedy I, 95).
There are two problems wi th this interpretation. First of all, it is very difficul t to see how the pagans can be blamed
for their lack offaith "in the nature of things." Yet Sayers insists that theirpunishmentfits "the outline of eternal justice.
In eternity they are deprived only of that which in life they refused - for it is the essence of heaven and hell that one
mustabideforeverwith that which one has chosen" ("Dante's Virgil," 62). The question is, how could they have refused
what they were never offered? If they had been offered faith in some mysterious way, they should be in a lower circle
of hell for having refused it. Secondly, there is the problem of the unbaptized infants who inhabit the same circle.
Certainly there is no possibility of free choice on their part.
And yet, on the level of allegory, Sayer's account does seem to explain the poetic reasons why Dante placed Limbo
in hell and put the good pagans in it. By placing Virgil and the good pagans in hell, Dante places a harsh judgment on
the natural man and shows clearly his own inadequacies. As Sayers explains:
For the whole theme of the Comedy is that Virgil is fundamental, indispensable, and yet of
himself inadequate. Man is inadequate. Natural Reason and art, Natural Morality, Natural
Religion, ifwithout grace, without Revelation, without Redemption, cannot at their best attain
any higher state than Limbo. ("Dante's Virgil," 60)
By placing the pagans in hell, Dante emphasizes the absolute character of the necessity of grace for
salvation. Such a construction also affords him the opportunity of setting up the allegory between their state
in Limbo and the inadequacies of their merely rational and humanly virtuous lives on earth. Ifhe had followed
Aquinas and simply left open the possibility of the salvation of the heathens without giving them a special place
in hell (Aquinas, De Vero 14.2), he would not have been able to use the allegorical structure he has set up
in the Inferno in order to show just how inadequate life is apart from faith and grace, no matter how noble and
virtuous it may be.
Even if Dante's version of Limbo does work well poetically and allegorically, the problem of understand-
ing its justice remains. Dante takes no short-cuts in trying to make that justice understandable. On the
contrary, his unusual treatment of Limbo seems to make the possibility of even beginning to understand it out
of the question. He did not have to place the unbaptized infants, whose position in hell demands that they
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scheme of hell in order to make it clear that its justice may not be as simple and neat as it might appear apart from Limbo.
Perhaps the question is not so much how the justice of Limbo fits in with that of hell, but rather vice versa. The very
justice of the rest of hell ,which seems so clear, becomes more mysterious itself when it is understood in the lightofglaring
fact of Limbo.
There is a great temptation to ignore Dante's hints and warning about the limitations of Virgil's account of the
justice of hell. By placing his impossible Limbo within that account, Dante makes much less likely the temptation of
thinking that one can fully understand divine justice through mere human reasoning. Because the justice of hell can
be fully understood only together with that of Limbo, the questions that arise later in the Paradiso concerning the
salvation of the pagans can be seen to apply to Dante's whole conception c:i justice in some way.
In Canto 19 of the Paradiso, Dante the Pilgrim hopes to have his doubt solved concerning the salvation of the
unbaptized, but in the end, he is led only to see that the mystery of God's justice is even deeper than he had thought
(Paradiso 19. 60). The only real reliefhe gets for his doubt comes in the form c:ia mystery just as deep and beyond human
understanding, the mystery of divine grace. Here he "marvels" at the fact that a relatively unknown Trojan, Ripheus,
was saved by a special grace enabling him to believe in Christ before his actual coming (Paradiso 20.100-125). Finally,
he is led to the ultimate mystery of predestination, and warned "not to presume any more to advance toward
understanding such a goal" (Paradiso 21. 97-98). What emerges ultimately from Dante's extended treatment of the
Pilgrim's doubt is that the workings of divine justice and divine grace rationally cannot be understood by the human
mind, but must be accepted in faith. And because Limbo intimately is tied up with the rest c:i hell, Dante's rational
account c:i the justice in the Inferno as a whole cannot be supposed to suffice without the help of faith.
Dante's aggravation of the problems of justice serves to make this absolute need for divine help in understanding
as clear as possible. Beatrice tells Dante in Canto 4 of the Paradiso that "for our justice to appear unjust in mortal eyes
is a proof of faith, not of heresy" (lines 7-9). Dante seems to have done his best to make sure that his account of God's
justice in the Inferno does not come off as being too just to human eyes due to its ingenious and convincing reasoning.
Dante certainly does not downplay the importance and value c:i reason in relation to faith, but clearly wants to show
that in matters of justice and grace, one ultimately must submit in faith. Only the "faith that destroys every error" can
be trusted to reach the truth in these difficult matters (Inferno 4. 47-48). As Lumentani points out:
" Just as Dante uses his treatment of Limbo to emphasize the absolute inability of man to save himself apart from grace,
he also uses it to emphasize the absolute inability of man to understand the justice and grace c:i God. The tension
between reason and faith exists because the realm of faith goes so much beyond that c:i reason. Regarding mysteries
which reason cannot look very deeply into, "the only course for a believing Christian [is) to submit his intellect to the
mystery of God's judgment" (53). There is much reasoning in the Comedy, but Dante is careful to make sure that the
reader does not get caught in the trap of thinking that such reasoning can ever exhaust the mystery of God's justice and
mercy, even in the case of his own seemingly clear and satisfactory account.
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Gedanken uber Siddhartha
by Breanainn Carmody
Die Suche nach dem Selbst ist ein bekanntes Thema in den Werken Hermann Hesses. Seine Romane Demian,
Narziss und Goldmund und Siddhartha ereahlen von diesern archetypischen Suchen. Der Weg ist sehr schwer fur
Emil Sinclair, Goldmund, und besonders fur Siddhartha. Seine Geschichte ereignet sich zur Zeit des Buddha im
ural ten Indien, Siddhartha beschreibt das Streben eines Mannes, der Weisheit und Erleuchtung sucht.
Die indische Szenerie dieser Novelle verdient einige Beachtung. Hesses Stil ist einfach und fliessend wie der
indische Fluss, wo Siddharta seinen Frieden gefunden hat. Es ist augenscheinlich, dass Hesse schon eine personliche
Beziehungzum Osten hatte (er hatte durch seine Farnilie viel davon gehort und war auch selbstnach Indierigereist).
Siddharthas Weg zum Frieden ist auch interessant. Zuerst ist er ein Bramahne, ein Priester, und dann wird er ein
Asket. Es scheint mir aber, dass er mehr von der Kurtisane Kamala und dem Kaufmann Kamaswami aus der
kindischen Welt von "Sansara" lemte als durch seine Weisheit und Lebensvemeinung. Er musste sein Selbst
zerstoren, und er konnte das nur in der kindischen Welt erreichen. Dann wurde er unschuldig und einfach wie ein
Kind; dann konnte erden Frieden finden. Vorher war er zu intelligent, zu hochrnutig, um diese Weisheit zu finden.
Er lemte das Zuhoren von dem Fahrrnann Vasudeva. Am wichtigsten war die Liebe, die er erfuhr, als er seinem
Sohn diente. Die Liebe stand im Gegensatz zur normalen indischen Philosophie, aber Siddharra fand seine
Erleuchtung durch diese Liebe zur Welt.
Die Lehrerfigur ist typisch fur Hesses Werke. Wie Emil Sinclair und Goldmund ihren Demian und Narziss
hatten, so bekommt Siddhartha seine Lehrer in den Samanas, der schonen Kamala, und in Vasudeva. Die Samanas
lehren ihn die Selbstvemeinung, wahrendervon Kamala Liebeskunstund Lebensgenuss lemt. Ais Brahmane hatte
Siddharta nie gewusst, wie man richtig horen soil. Vasudeva hat ihn das Zuhoren gelehrt, und danach konnte er
das Geheimnis des Flusses lemen. Nun versteht er die Zeitlosigkeit der Existenz. Siddhartha selbst fungiert als
Lehrer durch seine Beziehung zu seinem Kindheitsfreund Govinda. Dieser Schuler des Buddha war verloren und
verwirrt, als er ihn nach Jahren wieder sah, aber Siddharrha konnte ihn gut beraten.
Der Fluss ist ein archetypisches Symbol. Er stellt die Veranderung der rnenschlichen Existenz dar. Der
griechische Philosoph Herakli t ha t den Fluss als Beispiel fur seine Meinung uber den ewigen Wechsel aller Dinge
gebraucht. Siddhartha hat gemerkt, dass in der Stimme des Flusses die Stimmen aller Geschopfe enthalten waren.
Dieses Geheimnis, zusammen mit seiner Liebesfahigkeit, hat ihrn geholfen, seinen Frieden zu finden.
Hesse betont die Wichtigkeit der Suche nach dem Selbst. Er beschreibt sie fast als eine religiose Erfahrung.
Hesses Helden sind bewundernswurdig, weil sie auf ihren Wegen zur Erleuchtung keinem regelmassigen Schema
folgen; sie schmieden selbstandig ihre eigenen Schicksale und finden dadurch ihren eigenen Frieden.
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Tradition and Innovation in Borromini's Renaissance
Masterpiece, Carlo alle Quattro Fontane
by John Dovic
Many aspects of Borromini's San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane are unprecedented and unique in their architectural
incarnation, yet underlying all the sinuous curves and inspiring details is a knowledge of preceding styles and theories
of art, mingled with Borromini's personal inspiration by nature.
The form of the church itself, loosely based on a Greek cross transformed by ovals, has roots in the Renaissance
development ci centrally planned churches, which itself was influenced by classical Roman temples. The writings of
Vitruvius, as interpreted in the Renaissance by Alberti, proclaimed the beauty of the circle and the perfection of nature
to which man should look for inspiration. Yet Borromini takes this centrally focused circle and elonga tes it, so that while
retaining the beauty and structurally harmonizing effect of the curves, he adds a dimension of basi Iican axiality and focus
to one end of the church, albeit without the use of straight aisles and side aisles. One is thus treated to a mingling of
both plans; the curves imitate natural fluidity and the ideals of Alberti, and the elongation leads the eye straight ahead
to the altar. The eye is also drawn upwards to the central dome of the church, not immediately, but via the altar and.
its capping half-dome.
Though having respect for the appreciation ci nature in the Renaissance, Borromini did not limit himself to its
geometric and numerical rules. He was more influenced by the mannerists' disregard for formality, and in particular,
by Michelangelo. Some of the dramatic curvature characteristic of Borromini is foreshadowed in the imposing stairway
and wall ornaments of the Lauretian library in Florence. The plasticity ci architecture, not its angularity and rigidity,
was ci interest to Borromini.
Earlier influences on his work are seen, of course, in classical Roman buildings. The Pantheon, with its central plan
and deeply coffered dome, no doubt had some bearing on Borromini's treatment of the dome in San Carlo; in fact, the
half-dome over the altar in the Pantheon, following its Christian conversion, has an identical coffered design. Hadrian's
Villa and the Palace of Nero, with their respective treatments ci circular and domed spaces, set a precedent for
curvilinear architecture which Borromini, among others, adopted. The church of Santa Costanza, and especially the
coffering of its barrel-vaulted ambulatory constructed by Constantine in JJO as a mausoleum for his daughter and
converted into a church in 1256, may also have provided inspiration.
For Borromini, as for most Renaissance architects, columns were primarily used for decoration. The larger columns
of San Carlo do seem to have structural purpose in carrying heavy establatures, but they are backed by walls, not entirely
free-standing and adhering to Albertian principles; they do not carry arches. They serve mainly to demarcate sections
of the church to outline the meeting of opposing concave and convex walls. Smaller columns go even further in their
decorative role; they, along with pilasters, create niches for statues and other decorative features.
Another major influence on Borromini was Giovanni Battista Montano, who in 1624 published a book of
architectural drawings based on unusual examples of classical architecture. He did not seek a unity and conformity in
architecture, but found discrepancies and played on them in fanciful and imaginative ways, free from rigid conventions.
Borromini apparently took on a similar attitude, and though basing himself most generally on classical and accepted
form, (he went off on curvaceous tangents).
Borromini, before taking on the commission of San Carlo, had worked with Carlo Maderno and Bernini, from
whom he may have developed principles of Baroque architecture which he nonetheless implements in his unique style,
full of disdain for their attitudes of architecture as a reflection ci human proportions. A major difference between
Borromini and Bernini can be seen in their treatment of sculpture within architecture: for Bernini sculpture was
animating and part of a theatrical story, as in his framing of the stained glass window with frolicking angels in the apse
of St. Peter's; for Borromini, sculpture, when not embodied abstractly in the curves of the architecture itself, was
supplemental to the architecture and fit itself in as best it could, as with the angels framing the statue of San Carlo on
the facade.
Borromini freed architecture and stone from conventional constraints. His reliance on and appreciation for the
forms of nature led to an architecture of fluidity, that, though hinted at in earlier buildings, was liberated from the
"perfection" of the circle and other geometric conventions with rhythmic curve and flow.
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Madame Bovary: The Absurdity of Romantic
Ideals in a Base Society
by Patrick Butler
Madame Bovary has an incurably romantic view of what life should be like. Through each phase of her life, Emma
imagines idealized future situations. She believes that entering the convent has some mystic spell; she thinks that living
on a farm has some rustic charm; she sees married life as a stroll under a full moon with her husband reading poetry to
her; she dreams that an affair has some sweet, forbidden sensuality; finally, she views death as the dramatic end to a
wretched, luckless existence. Every time that one of her utopian, romantic thoughts fails in reality, Emma recalls the
past as a much better time when, in fact, the past had just been a disappointment of past dreams. Thus, in a sometimes
comical, sometimes bitter satire, Flaubert reveals the absurdity of romanticism and the irony of reality.
Emma desires a life of storybook pleasures for herself. As a child filled with glorified ideas of life in the convent,
Emma reads novels that portray a more appealing form of romanticism. She becomes filled with ideas of courtly love.
She can no longer be bound by the simple pleasures of convent life or life on her father's farm. The heroines of the novels
live in grand settings and marry the most charming men or, oppressed by their wretched husbands, they endure suffering
until their white knight, the perfect lover, deli vers them. In her attempt to uve out her romantic ideals, Emma discovers
that reality differs from the fantastic and her life withers with her dreams.
Not finding even temporary satisfaction in her marriage to Charles, Emma becomes ill as her wish for a romance-
filled marriage remains unfulfilled. Charles, overjoyed with the simple pleasures of his life, has no idea that his wife finds
him unable to reveal "the intensities of passion, the refinements of life, all the mysteries" (46). In a new setting Emma
finds a love that society forbids, but she eventually loses Leon. Emma then plays the role of the suffering heroine. She
believes that her external display of generosity and cordiality while suffering internally shows nobility of character, but
it actually reflects a selfish protest of what she considers to be fate. Furthermore, as in marriage, the initial thought of
suffering degenerates into something that has no romantic value.
Viewing an affair as the only escape from her fruitless suffering, Emma relinquishes her reservations concerning
social disapproval and succumbs to the attraction of Rodolphe's status and deceptive charm. Flaubert reveals the
absurdity of the seduction through the juxtaposition of Rodolphe's persuasive phrases with the announcements of the
agricultural show:
"Did I have any idea that I'd be coming with you to...,!he show?"
"Seventy francs!"
"A hundred times I was on the point of leaving and yet I followed you and stayed with you ..."
"For the best manures."
"...as I'd stay with you tonight, tomorrow, every day, all my life." (168)
The beginning of the affair consists in many superficial, romantic gestures, but these gestures disappear as the lovers
become more familiar wi th one another. At this point, a significant but incomplete change occurs in Emma. She realizes
that none of her attempts at romantic happiness has worked and she vows to make the best of what she has been given
in life. However, when Charles' attempt at greatness fails, she cannot live with his failure and she returns to Rodolphe,
who, finally leaves, causing her a deathly-ill state.
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The reappearance of Leon in Emma's life allows her one more chance for true love. The occasional rendezvous
between Emma and Leon have the appearance of authentic fulfillment; however, since their encounters come at large
intervals, their imaginations allow them to exaggerate each other's virtues. Then, desire drives Emma to lie to Charles
so that she can see Leon once a week. She also tries to satisfy her love of material things by signing notes of debt with
Lheureux. During the frequent meetings that follow Emma's deception of Charles, Emma and Leon lose their lofty
feelings toward each other. They still have mutual attraction, but Emma degenerates into a pure sensualist to maintain
higher, ecstatic passion; she becomes a user like Rodolphe. Because Leon senses the change in Emma and wants
something better for himself, he distances himself from her and their love loses importance.
Finally, when forced to look at a practical side oflife, Emma romanticizes her pligh tun ril harsh real ity exposes itself.
The threat of her financial deceptions being exposed to Charles causes Emma to perform base acts that contradict her
romantic ideals. At the notary's house she begs, but refuses to relinquish her pride and prostitute herself. Then, at
Rodolphe's house she begs and offers to relinquish her pride and prostitute herself. Failing in all practical endeavors,
Emma does what any romantic heroine would do and commits suicide in a traditional manner; she poisons herself and
leaves a note saying that her death is nobody's fault. However, when the pain and unattractiveness of death strike, she
cannot even find solace in the way that she dies.
Emma experiences a loss of everything that she gains in life by trying to gain something unattainable. Amidst
Emma's downfall another element of society thri ves. Homais embodies this element (to which Lheureux also belongs).
He, like Emma, deceives and manipulates people, but he applies himself to base, practical ideas whereas Emma grasps
for lofty, unreachable ideas. The primary basis for Homais' success stems from his lack of belief in anything except
improving his status, both socially and financially. The irony that this reality presents is that if a person strives for
anything higher than the mundane, he will fail, but if a person relinquishes all scruples and seeks only to impress society
through deception and flattery, he will succeed. Flaubert thus presents a satiric picture of romanticism highlighted by
the base requirements of social greatness.
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Keats' "In drear..nighted December":
Melancholy Memories of Past Happiness
by Tom Lawler
Keats' poem "Indrear-nighted December" presents the melancholy reflections of a persona who laments his painful
state. He speaks of nature as the impersonal, unfeeling element which cannot understand what it is like to remember
past joys which are no longer. Then he turns to reflect upon the state ci mankind and wishes that man could be so
unaffected by his memory and its often painful remorse.
This theme of remorse is presented by Keats' use of figurative language. The first line of the poem sets an initial
tone of somber melancholy. The words "drear-nighted" suggest an unhappy state of the soul. "December" reflects the
cold, death-like and frozen condition ci the persona's feelings. The diction is colloquial and simple, making the poem
seem direct and tensely stated. The rhyme scheme stays regular throughout the three stanzas, with a stable, quieting
effect.
Each stanza is short, consisting of generally iambic lines with three stresses per line. The rhyme scheme in all the
stanzas (ababcccd) reflects the emotion evoked. The first four lines alternate in rhyme setting a congenial, somber tone.
But then, the next three lines all rhyme, presenting a rising tension and a building up of the power of the rhyme. Finally,
the last line changes the rhyme in a dramatic shift, as if to abruptly disrupt the growing repetition of rhyme. By this
device, the rhyme reflects the emotional character of the poem, with its somber beginning, growing intensity, and final
resoluteness.
The material of the poem isdivided into three reflections. The first (stanza 1) is an address toasolitary tree, standing
bare in the cold winter. It stands in opposition to the frozen, numbing north wind. The question arises as to how this
tree can be "too happy." The poet seems to be saying that because the tree cannot remember (1.3) the time when it
bloomed wi th green freshness, it ishappy and lucky. The wind from the north (I. 5-6) has no power to affect the memory
of the tree and cannot destroy it. This strength is why the tree is happy compared to the persona who envies the tree.
This image is reflected in the changing meter of line 6 which begins with an anapest and continues with trochees. Yet,
since the wind cannot "undo" the tree, the rhyme returns to iambic in line 7.
The second stanza compares the state of the personc' s soul to a river or brook. Like the tree, the brook is "too happy"
because it is unaffected by remorse. The brook cannot remember its happier times when it flowed with "bubblings" in
the summer. Again, the meter changes in line 6 from iambic to trochaic to emphasize the comparison. Since the
memories of better times do not cause "petting" or a turning away from complacency, the rhyme returns to iambic in
line 7. The end rhyme of line 7 links it to the rhyme of stanza 1, as if to say that both the tree and the brook share a
common element.
The Greek mythology reference in line 4 of stanza 2 gives it a more serious, reflective and stately tone. The brook
issubtly compared to Lethe, the Greek riverofforgetting. This image is central to understanding the theme of the poem,
which is the desire to escape remorse and the pain ci today which is brought on by remembering the joys of yesterday.
Stanza III begins with the interjection "Ah" which signals the persona's acceptance of his condition. He then
reflects that it is a shame that young people cannot be so unaffected by the poet as nature is. With this rhetorical
statement, the persona becomes more calmly accepting of his own feelings. He asks in the next line if there were anyone
who was not "writhed" or stung and afflicted by the sharp pain of remorse. The verb is appropriate to this stanza because
it contrasts sharply with the calmness of the earlier line ("gentle girl or boy"). It startles the reader to think of a child
writhing in pain because of his passed happiness. The imagery evoked by this line is of an innocent animal struck by
something painful.
Finally, the last lines attempt to express the purpose of the poem. Keats is saying that this experience of feeling
what is not felt was never expressed by poetry before. The unfeeling elements of nature cannot tell us what it is like to
be unaffected by remorse. That iswhy it "was never said in rhyme. "The persoru reflects upon his own attempt to express
the helplessness and despair ("more to heal it/ nor numb sense to steel it") which he feels. The only way man can express
this sentiment is by verse ("rhyme"). Nature (the tree or brook) has no need to express it because it is not afflicted; it
is "too happy." .
Thus, Keats successfully utters the cry of despair and remorse. By using devices such as personification of nature and
strong imagery, he creates a poem which tells the suffering of a man haunted by memories of past happiness. He
successfully relates the condition of his soul "In drear-nighted December."
(This essay was written in one hour as part of the senior comprehensive examiTUltions.)
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A Natural Wretchedness in America's Founding
by Jason Henderson
Even at the time of drafting the Declaration of Independence, the "peculiar institution" known as American
slavery threw a wrench in the machinations of creating a society based entirely around the principle that "all men are
created equal" and that only through respect for this equality could a viable, healthy nation flourish. At the time, the
1770s, the debate was laid aside. Slavery was seen as a sadly necessary evil, whose disruption could be detrimental to
the economy of the South. Slaves, treated as something more than animal and less than human, were allowed to remain
on trade. Soon, however, the winds began to change. As the nation grew, and as Southern economics called for a new
interest in slave trade, the sides of the argument became more clear. The conflict was not one of promoting an animal
to the rank of man, but of deciding what to do with a race of men taught to see themselves as inferior but human. In
the end, either America was to uphold the less than one hundred year-old maxim that all men were created equal, or
hypocrisy must go aside and America would once and for all reject this as a passe and limited philosophy.
By the 1830s and 1840s, equality per se had ceased to be an issue on all sides. Some, such as David Walker, would
scoff at such an idea. Walker viewed blacks and whites as two distinct members of the same over-arching race who can
be traced to have distinct responses to the same stimuli. He maintained that "Natural observances taught me these
things: there is a solemn awe in the hearts of blacks, as it respects murdering men, whereas the whites (though they
are great cowards), where they have the advantage, ... they murder all before them" (Current 366). Walker saw the
races as "natural enemies" everywhere (367). By his standards, men should be treated differently because of their skin
color; nowhere did he recognize that each man should be judged individually with respect to himself.
Even Jefferson expressed dismay and indecision over the equality question. Many like him seemed to express a
feeling that, even if equality for blacks and whites were desirable, it might no longer be possible. Jefferson conjectured
"as suspicion only, that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are
inferior to the whites in the endowments of both body and mind" (367).
Some theorists, such as George Fitzhugh, held the long-touted American taste for equality in little regard at all.
'The free states of antiquity bounded wi th slaves," he asserted (415). Fitzhugh held that there are in nature superior and
inferior beings, and these are meant naturally to divide themselves as such without the interference oflaw. Abraham
Lincoln saw a destructive trend in such theories. He saw slavery as alien to the Declaration of Independence because
it undermined the wisdom that all men are created equal:
When we were political slaves of King George, we wanted to be free, we called the maxim that
"all men are created equal" a self-evident truth, but now, when we have grown fat, and have lost
all dread of being slaves ourselves, we have become so greedy to be masters that we call the same
maxim a "self-evident lie."
Without respect for equality, freedom for individuals, entire groups of people, had no chance of following.
Curiously, Fitzhugh saw the only true remnant of freedom in maintaining slavery. By his standards, freedom is
protection from mental and physical harm and unfairness. He compared slaves to women and children, saying, "He who
would emancipate women, unless he could make her as coarse and strong as man, would be her worst enemy ... ; to set
[her] free would be to give the lamb to the wolf to take care of. Society would quickly devour them" (418). In other
words, there resided with the naturally strongest a divine duty to protect the weaker from the dangers of free choice, a
free market, and employment competition. The drawback to such logic lies in the belief that men will be content to
live as captives, even if their captors proclaim themselves benevolent.
For American society to continue, neither the Fitzhughs nor the Walkers could be catered to. As Lincoln remarked,
"[H]e who be no slave must be content to have no slave. Those who deny freedom for others deserve it not for themselves;
and under a just God, cannot long retain it." It would take time for the future generations of blacks to begin actually
to rival the whites in learned arts, but the capacity to do sowas worth every ruined plantation itcreated. Finally America
had to own up to the words written one hundred years prior in the Declaration of Independence.
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What is Phenomenological Psychology?
by Carolyn Wehman
Phenomenological psychology has as its subject the human being in her everyday meaningful living. Phenome-
nology tries to describe and understand its subject in a way that is true to the person. It tries to return to "lived" behavior.
As Adrian van Kaam explains, "Phenomenological psychology, in its broadest defini tion, is an attempt to return to the
immediate meaning and structure of behavior as it actually presents itself' (14-15). To do so, phenomenology does not
follow the natural scientific methods. The quantitative approach that is valid for physics, chemistry, and biology is not
appropriate for the study of humans . It sees the natural scientific method as inappropriate for its living subject because
it misses what is uniquely human in the person: perception, cognition, memory, emotions and language. The meaning
that humans give to and receive from their life world is what is truly psychological.
Phenomenological psychology is a human science that finds its foundation in the everyday world as it is lived by
those who live in and through this world. The approach means to step into the person's world because it sees humans
as dwellers in the world. The phenomenon should be studied as part of the existence of the person, moved away from
the contrivances of the experimental psychology laboratory design which is an abstraction and artificial construal of real
world experience" (von Eckartsberg 56). In looking at the things in a person's world, phenomenology seeks to discover
the structures of meaning in human existence. The person is different from all other things in his world in a basic sense.
The human has the ability to give meaning and significance to the world and her existence within it. Man is involved
with the world; he is "a dialogue with things and processes in his own organism and in his surroundings. At the same
time, he remains a subject in the world and lets the world be for him by steadily uncovering its manifold meanings" (van
Kaam 7). The subject lives in the world and her living isprojected into it. Her worldly existence is the most fundamental
aspect of the person. No distinct line can be drawn between human and world. She is who she is through her presence
to things. The world of the person is the world as it is perceived by the person. Each person actively is involved and
makes the world her own. To be human is essentially to exist, and "to exist means to be-in-the-world" (van Kaam 7).
Heidegger used the word dasein ("being-there") to describe the fundamental structure and meaning of human existence.
The literal meaning of the word dasein shows the "ecstatic worldly nature of human existence: to be human is not simply
to be, it is to be there! Dasein is the individual human being, the Being-the-there" (Craig 11). The human being "shines
forth" and permits all that is to show itself in the "clearing" of this realm of world openness. Heidegger sees this openness
or clearing as necessary for human existence to be at all (Boss in Craig 66).
The person is not a set of determined, mechanical behavior and instinctual impulses. The human is free to choose
her own way of living, acting and responding as an autonomous being. For the person, the facticity of the past and of
the body does influence and motivate how the person is present to a given moment, but the past does not determine
the person's actions. Only humans have the capacity to transcend the given and move toward their possibilities. "Even
as transcendence the subject is freedom, he breaks through the determinism of the cosmos insofar as no facticity
whatsoever determines man's action as a human action" (Luijpen 243). The person as a subject in the world
intentionally creates certain styles of being in the world. The person freely directs her way through life, yet she is rooted
in the world as a thing. Her modes of perception are restricted by the structure of her body and her senses, by time, space
and language of her culture, her surroundings, and her interests (van Kaam 58). The person must overcome limitations
in order to realize new possibilities.
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Another important aspect of the human is sense of self-direcredness. The person is an openness toward many
possibilities, but he is always directed toward something in the world. The person directs her own way of relating with
the world. The quality of tending toward something is the way that a person is present to things and to the world. Her
nature is such that she can discover different meanings as "man is always and necessarily intentional; he is orientation,
directedness to the world; he is potential openness for all-that-is" (van Kaam 57). The person intentionally gives
meaning to the given world in a particular way.
The way for the person to have access to worldly living is through the body. Each person lives her body, she is in
the world in and through her body, and "the subject is immersed in the body and, through the body is involved in the
world" (Luijpen 59). The body is living itself: it is a tangible perspective on the world in a participatory manner. Things
are seen through a presence to the world that is bodily:
I could not feel, grasp, assimilate, understand, perceive, elucidate anything in the world without
this bridge which is my body, a bridge that is never absent but always present, a bridge which I
truly am. My body makes the world available to me; it is in and through my body that the world
becomes-for-me, becomes mine, my world. (van Kaam 16)
Each person, however, is not an isolated self. The human existence is a co-existence. Man is not alone. As Luijpen
puts it, "No aspect ci man's being man is what it is without the 'presence' ci other men in it. The presence of others
in my existence implies that my being-man is a being through others" {261-262}. It is only with others that a person
can be who she is. She is a subject in the world with others. It is with other people that a person gives meaning to
existence; a mother is a mother because she has children. One is human through others.
The phenomenological perspective is valuable because it has a unique understanding of these aspects of human
existence: immersion in the world, embodiment, living with others, intentionality and self-directedness. Phenomenol-
ogy sees these qualities as indivisible; each person is a unity. The person is not a set of characteristics, but a whole of
existence.
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Cinematic Construction and Classical
Catharsis In
Josef von Sternberg's
The Blue Angel
by Richard Martin
What are the consequences when even the best of society fall prey to the passions which their learning is designed
to guard them against? The Blue Angel (1930) by German director Josef von Sternberg examines the demise of Dr.
Immanuel Rath, a leading and well-respected professor in the secondary school, or gymnasium. In his attempts to
discipline his students - keeping them away from unsavory places - the professor becomes enamored of Lola Lola, a
striking nightclub singer-dancer. Ridiculed by his students and confronted by the headmaster, Dr. Rath determines to
marry the performer. His happiness is short-lived, and soon the doctor ismerely his wife's pawn, working in a disgruntled
fashion, collecting tips in the club. Before long the professor begins to work as a clown, with some success, as a form
of comic relief in between the girls' acts. When the troupe returns to Dr. Rath's home town, he embarrassedly takes the
stage where, diverted by the offstage action of Lola Lola being embraced in the arms of another man, the professor flies
into a rage. Detained and later released, Dr. Rath returns to his home where he is discovered in course to have died.
"Immanuel," from the Hebrew originally, is a common enough German name. However, its etymology should not
be forgotten; it means "God with us." "Rath" means "advice." The professor, then, could be said to be "the advice of
God among men." Certainly this role is correspondent tohis function as teacher of the youth. Yet the name also suggests
the man's angelic nature, in accord with the film's title. The matter of the professor's exact importance, other than as
main character, ironically is realized upon the consideration that the "blue angel," at least in terms of a literal
construction, is some sort of cardboard representation which moves about the stage, circling Lola Lola. "The Blue
Angel" juxtaposed upon "Immanuel Rath" hints to the audience that the professor's role as educator and moralist will
become entirely meaningless and as humorously ineffectual as the blue angel, whose sole purpose is to hang about Lola
Lola mindlessly.
At the film's commencement, Dr. Rath is awakened by his maid for breakfast. His chambers are dark and austere,
and he dresses in black as well. There is a long pipe which leads to the furnace and which extends from the far left-hand
side of the frame all the way across the top of the frame, culminating in the furnace. As the camera pans left, the pipe
is continued until it finally terminates - now at the opposite end of the room. This device frames the room; it achieves
a closed cinematic space. The viewer gets the sense that this room is somehow the whole of Dr. Rath's existence. His
books are all there - numerous volumes - and a globe sits alongside the books. The professor is protected here in his
chamber by his books; the framed scene is its own microcosm of a learned life. Perhaps the membranes of the doctor's
shell are as tenuous as the heating pipe; perhaps any sort of earth-shaking experience could bring down the pipe and
the feeble protection of the books. Sternberg himself writes, "The camera is only an accessory to the human eye and
serves principally to frame - to include and to exclude. Within the frame the artist collects that which he wished us
to share with him; beyond the frame is placed what he considers of no value to his thought." Sternberg has carefully
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chosen what he wished to include and exclude. The effect he achieves is that Rath comes across as a Faustian figure.
Here is a man who has all the knowledge available to the human reason, yet even this is not enough, as the director will
prove, to assure that he will perform his duties and live his life in the failsafe manner he would like to imagine.
In this opening scene, the direction also points out the major symbolism which will be carried extensively through
the whole of the film. In an otherwise completely silent setting, the professor whistles hoping to get a response from
his caged bird. Not hearing anything, Dr. Rath walks toward the cage, lifts the bird, and notices the animal is dead. The
maid comes and says indifferently, "No more singing." She tosses the carcass into the furnace. The bird reappears only
a few moments later, at the gymnasium, where the mischievous boys play with a novelty - a card with a picture of Lola
Lola on it. Her "skirt" is composed of so many real feathers. The crude game is to blow on the feather, thereby lifting
Lola Lola's "skirt." The boys race to their seats and hide the toy when their master, Dr. Rath, arrives.
Later on, after the professor "falls in love" with Lola Lola, he wakes in the morning, hung-over, to the sound of a
singing bird. Lola Lola, like the professor, also keeps a caged bird. It is as if the doctor's dead bird has come back to life.
Dr. Rath shortly hereafter begins his downward slide; he leaves the school, marries the singer, and srays on with his wife's
band of performers. The leader of the troupe is a magician. At the wedding party, he is invited to srage a few of his tricks;
he pulls eggs out of thin air, or rather, from the couple's noses! They begin to cackle like chickens. This scene is recalled
at the climax of the film, when the professor, dressed as a clown, stands on stage in his home town and is assaulted atop
his head with eggs at the hand of the magician. The scene, played for laughs, nonetheless mortifies the professor. To
add to his shame, he notices Lola Lola embracing another man backstage. Dr. Rath now makes those familiar chicken
sounds - this time not jovially, but in rage - and he flees the stage in a terror, presumably attacking the amours in
a sequence of violence which is not recounted visually on the screen.
Dr. Rath's association of the real birds - his dead bird with the living bird of his future wife - is an unrealistic hope
for better things to come into his barren life. His life is "dead," while the life of Lola Lola seems vibrant and "alive."
He mistakes what are appearances for the real satisfaction for which he longs. His "becoming" a dirty bird, a chicken,
suggests that he is less than his nature; his choices and the life he leads amidst the performers dehumanize him - he
is stripped of the reason which makes him a man and is given the nature of an animal. The audience gets the sense that
he is no longer in control when it is obvious that he is ordered around entirely by his wife. She takes away part of his
identity when she insists that he should have his beard, in order to increase the sales of those novelty cards (which his
students have purchased before). Dr. Rath walks about despondently, bereft of all that constituted his personality and
his essential humanity.
Inserted disturbingly among the recurrent bird symbolism is the presence of another clown. He keeps watching the
developments in the courting and subsequent adventures of the doctor and his beloved. The clown's face is not the
theatrically happy one; rather it is the face of depression, the face of a troubled inner life. When the viewer witnesses
the sad decline of Dr. Rath, he perceives that the professor is one in a long line of cuckolds; he is her new "clown," and
he will be ushered out just like the one before him.
The professor has mistaken the illusory stage world for the real world. There is a scrim on the stage, which, at the
film's end, separates Dr. Rath from his unfaithful wife. The stage is always faithful; the stage iswhere Lola Lola can sing
with all honesty "Falling in Love Again." Yes, the person behind the persona is falling in love min, and she will fall
in love again, married or not. It is no wonder she laughs when he proposes to her.
The clubs as a setting are "unreal" to begin with. They are dark and hazy, smelling of tobacco and corruption. The
club is the place the professor visits so that he might rid the establishment of his students. Who could have guessed he
would be tied to the club for his livelihood? When the spotlight sets upon the professor, the facts of his future are written
in stone. But perhaps the doctor's fate is more predictable than even he would think. After all, the maid comments on
the smell of tobacco in the apartment; is this the missing link in the professor's personality? Is he inclined secretly to
the nightlife of immorality? Does he enjoy scolding his students for their indiscretions because he recognizes the
deficiency in himself? This is all psychologically speculative. The film does not offer any clear answers, except that Dr.
Rath's nature is unquestionably weak and spurious. Clearly too, he lives under the pressure of appearances.
The audience cannot help, however, but experience a catharsis. The purging of the emotions through pity and fear
is accomplished cinematically by the audience's identification with the main character. The doctor's story is truly tragic
- and in the Aristotelian understanding of the term. Dr. Rath, from all appearances, is a great man of learning who
is dedicated to his work and to his students. Ifhe desires a "secret life," the audience is not privy to it, so it is relegated
to the realm of conjecture. The viewer has to admit that the doctor is a noble personage who, because of a flaw in
character - in this case, falling in love imprudently - undergoes a reversal of fortune, a fall into misery. "Tragedy"
in The Blue Angel consists in Dr. Rath's fall into a state which is not human. The viewer may identify passionately with
the professor because through the entire film the camera has followed this main character and no other. The viewer
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does not see through the eyes of Dr. Rath per se - as perhaps in Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge - yet there is a definite
subjective leaning taken in the narrative. The plot is unraveled in terms ci Dr. Rath; the cinematic angle is not a
dispassionate third person storytelling device. The audience sees all the emotion of Dr .Rath, and they feel the full force
of the action because ci their close association with the trials of the professor.
Josef von Sternberg is meticulous with his details. Sound, editing and language are just as important in creating
meaning as symbol, theme and setting. The montage effectively and disconcertingly communicates contrasts between
what has already been discussed as a dichotomy between real and imagined time. When the professor wakes with Lola
Lola, he is smiling, the bird is singing and the atmosphere is heaven-like. The actress' apartment is flooded with light.
The edit takes the viewer to the "real" life of the professor's lodgings. Again, his room is dark. His maid enters his room
to discover Dr. Rath missing. He is not where he should be, and the edit declares the fact to be true. Dark and dreary
as his otherworld may be, it is the life which is most real for him; it is that for which he has worked for years. The professor
acts childishly, staying out all night - he is no better than the students he scolds.
Sound is almost completely absent from The Blue Angel, except for dialogue and the singing in the club. Sound does
surface starkly, but not until the very end of the film. After Dr. Rath has been released from his straight-jacket, he goes
to his old home. The next scene shows a man in a heavy cloak and dark hat approaching the dwelling; the sound is eerie
and it reaches a crescendo as the mysterious man enters the home, finally coming upon the professor. The heavy-handed
use of the medium strikes to the bone largely because it has not been used until now in any way which would color the
narrative. Sternberg's placement here of this harsh music seems to say that not only has the professor died, but he has
also not benefited from any sort of moral revival which could have been the result of his tragic downfall.
One notices, especially owing to the reaction of the students when they discover the liaison between their master
and Lola Lola, the particularly jarring use of language. The students, who have been disciplined for the frivolity which
they now witness manifest in Dr. Rath, shout "Garbage!" Hypocrisy is garbage, as is the course of action upon which
the professor embarks. One curious aspect of the language that arises only as a consequence of providing The Blue Angel
with English subtitles is the fact that titles are supplied only under the most crucial circumstances of interpretation.
There are many scenes where no titles are given at all- for instance, at the wedding party. The audience does need
to know that the students are shouting "Garbage!" and not "Bravo!" so the title is given. But most of the time the
filmakers rely upon common human experience to suggest the content of meaning and language in several instances.
This is reminiscent of T. S. Eliot's theory of the objective correlative; that is, that a particular pattern of events, a
situation, or set of objects bring about a particular correlative emotion, regardless of speech barriers. Thus, on at least
one level, the film is universally aimed - and the filmmakers recognize this fact in their execution of the art.
The Blue Angel, despi te its themes of self-deception and imagined reality, communica res a very real portrai t of life.
The cinematography deliberately refuses to call attention to itself - refusing thereby to admit, in the course of the
seamless narrative, the artifice of the vision. Sternberg wants his viewers to accept his vision as something experienced
and universal; self-deception and consequent tragic downfall is something which is not reserved for Germany. The
austere silence and the shocking editing that show the reality-dream world dichotomy also contribute largely to the
creation of this realistic presentation of the dilemma of tragic misapprehension of appearances. In the end however,
Sternberg's particularly grim vision of human possibilities iscountered by his representation of the opposite of Dr. Rarh's
failure. If books and teaching were the way for the professor, no matter how lonely he may have been, to achieve his
ultimate dignity as a human, then there is value in the books and in the teaching for him. Sternberg seems to say that,
despite the professor's wasting of time, time is always retrievable; it is never too late to regain one's dignity and purpose
in the world.
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A Moral Defense of Capitalism
by James W. Bush, III
The idea of communism was developed in the nineteenth century in response to an increasing disillusionment with
the capitalist system in the Western World. This was a period in history during which the majority of the population
in most civilized countries belonged to a working class exploited by a minority who owned and operated the means of
production. The radical response to the harsh and cruel conditions imposed on the populous surfaced in the ideology
of communism proposed by Karl Marx in his infamous Communist Manifesto. Marx advocated and ultimately incited
rebellion as the solution to the class oppression. However, a more realistic and positive approach came in the form of
a papal encyclical by Pope Leo XIII. Known as Rerum Nooorwn or On theCondition of the Working Classes, it supported
capitalism, but called for certain improvements.
In the opening line of The Communist Manifesto, Marx claimed that "[tlhe history of all hitherto existing society
is the history of class struggles" (9). He believed that history would bring inevitable class confl ict between the proletariat
workers and the bourgeios capitalists, leading to the eventual destruction of capitalism. Marx developed his theories
of exploitation and of alienation, which explained the sole cause of the suffering of the working class as the drive of the
capitalists to attain greater material wealth by increasing and revolutionizing production. Marx recognized that men,
women, and children were exploited by being forced to work long hours at difficult, slave-like jobs for meager
subsistence-level wages. In explaining their alienation, Marx observed that "owing to the extensive use of machinery
and to division of labor, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character and consequently, all charm for
the workman" (16).
Marx went on to accuse the capitalists of centralizing the means of production, "concentrating property in a few
hands," and creating a national government and system of laws to protect themselves and exploit the workers" (13).
Given this character, Marx believed that capitalism was self-destructive, for the exploitative means of production that
it had developed would become the uniting force for a rebellious working class: "Not only has the bourgeoisie forged
the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons, the
modem working class, the proletarians" (15). Thus, if pushed hard enough, the Communist workers would rebel,
overthrowing the capitalists and abolishing provate property, since "property is based on the antagonism of capital and
wage-labor" and is symbolic of the capitalists' control of the workers (23).
In his 1891 encyclical, On the Condition of the Working Classes, Pope Leo XIIl recognized, as did Marx, the
exploitation of the masses by a small class of wealthy and often inhumane employers. Unlike Marx, however, Pope Leo
did not believe that socialism or communism offered a viable solution to the atrocities associated with the capitalist
system. He stated that doing away with private property would actually do more harm than good for the workers. Pope
Leo maintained that man by nature has the right to possess private property, and since the worker supplies his labor
in return for wages, he has the right to dispose of them freely. Pope Leo warned, "In abolishing the freedom to dispose
of wages [the socialists] take away from [the workers] by this very act the hope and the opportunity of increasing their
property" (8). Also unlike Mark, Leo XIII foresaw that class conflict was not necessary: "If the productive activity of
the multitude can be stimulated by the hope of acquiring some property in land, ... one class will become neighbor to
the other" (41). He further emphasized that the middle class does not truly look upon the poor with hostile intent, and
should not therefore be accused of doing so. Leo XIIl did acknowledge and condemn the exploitation of workers, but
he insisted thata solution could be found iflabor and capital would cooperate. Because the capitalists need the workers,
and the workers need the capitalists, each should do their part to foster a harmonious relationship. The workers should
perform to the best of their ability, while the employers should respect their dignity 08-19, 35).
Marx developed a logical and intelligent argument using simple language and very selective historical examples to
support his interpretation. However, his writing was actually a reaction to the social injustice of the period in which
he lived and nota solution to what he referred to as a history of class conflicts. For this reason, The Communist Manifesto
did not present a solution to the problems in capitalist society in the nineteenth century. Marx inci ted rebellion agai nst
a system that he believed imposed suffering on the masses. He proposed a classless, propertyless society instead in which
each man would work according to his ability and receive according to his need. Yet he did not address how order could
be maintained in such a society. Nor did he deal with such factors as jealousy that is inherent in all men.
Pope Leo XIII acknowledged the suffering and injusticeof this period inhistory, but rather than creating a new social
order, he suggested positive ways of improving the existing system. He stated, in opposition to Marx, that "in civil society
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the lowest cannot be made equal [in wealth] with the highest"(16). He also argued that there is no reason for there to
be conflict between classes if the exployers pay fair wages, treat the workers wi th respect, and allow them the opportunity
to acquire private property. He insisted that no man should be exploited or treated as a mere slave, for this opposes his
God-givendignity. In LeoXIII's view, a reformed capitalist society isbetter than a communist society because it provides
the incentive for one's own livelihood and it encourages individualism, unlike the "uniform wretchedness and meanness
of communism" (15).
Capitalism and communism, as characterized by Marx and Pope Leo XIII, are placed at opposite ends of the socio-
economic spectrum. Marx percei ved capi talism to be evil and destructi ve, yet he promoted a violent rebellion to achieve
a harmonious and classless society in which all would somehow become completely equal in wealth. He proposed a
society in which there would be no incentive to work because one's needs would be fulfilled anyway. Pope Leo XIII,
in contrast, realized the problems with Marx's communism and saw it as a far greater evil than capitalism. He argued
convincingly that a reformed capitalist society which respects the dignity of humanity - by, for example, offering fair
wages, good working conditions, and equal opportunity - is what the world actually needs.
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